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INTRODUCTION 
 In Brown v. Board of Education,
1
 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the question whether state-mandated racial segregation of public 
school students violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2
 In the course of answering 
that question in the affirmative, the Court stated, “we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”3 Considering “public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation,”4 the Court held “that in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”5  
Over the years and decades past, some (not all)
6
 scholars and 
commentators have argued that the result in Brown squares with 
 
 
   A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author acknowledges 
and is thankful for the research support provided by the University of Houston Law Foundation. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 3. 347 U.S. at 492 (referring to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 83 (1954). 
 4. 347 U.S. at 492–93. 
 5. Id. at 495. 
 6. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 151 (2d ed. 1997) (the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
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originalism.
7
 This thesis points to the “widespread belief that the decision 
was inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”8 Robert Bork, an avowed originalist, noted that “Brown has 
become the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all 
persuasions seek to capture it, because any theory that seeks acceptance 
must, as a matter of psychological fact, if not logical necessity, account for 
the result in Brown.”9 Another prominent originalist, Michael McConnell, 
has observed that the “supposed inconsistency between Brown and the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous 
importance in modern debate over constitutional theory. Such is the moral 
authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the 
conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is seriously 
discredited.”10 
 
 
intend to prohibit racially segregated public schools; “no one then imagined that the equal protection 
clause might affect school segregation”); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 229 (1996) (the framers 
did not intend to outlaw racial segregation in public schools). 
 7. As understood and used herein, the term originalism refers to:  
[A] family of constitutional theories, united by two core ideas, fixation and constraint. The 
Fixation Thesis claims the original meaning (“communicative content”) of the constitutional 
text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. The Constraint Principle claims 
that constitutional actors (e.g., judges, officials, and citizens) ought to be constrained by the 
original meaning when they engage in constitutional practice (paradigmatically, deciding 
constitutional cases). 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015); see also Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 517, 521 (2011) (originalism “almost always assumes that the meaning of any particular 
constitutional provision is fixed at some historical moment”).  
 8. FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 92 (2013). 
 9. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 77 
(1990). 
 10. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 
952 (1995). See also J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 17 (Geoffrey R. 
Stone ed., 2012) (“Brown affords living constitutionalists a nonoriginalist case whose ultimate salutary 
effect on American equality properly renders the result nearly immune from criticism.”); ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
280 (2006) (“Some have claimed that any respectable account of constitutional adjudication must be 
able to justify Brown. In view of such claims, theorists have gone to implausible lengths to square their 
accounts with Brown.”); Justin Driver, The Significance of the Frontier in American Constitutional 
Law, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 358 (“Brown has become a litmus test for theories of constitutional 
interpretation, as any theory worth its salt must accommodate the decision”); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Lecture, What Can Brown® Do For You: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal 
Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009) (“Precisely because Brown has become the crown 
jewel of the United States Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A 
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a constitutional theory 
without traction.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) 
(“[C]onservatives who are generally sympathetic to originalism cannot openly say that Brown v. Board 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/5
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The late Justice Antonin Scalia was a member of the Brown-is-
originalist camp. He was a prominent advocate of originalism,
11
 more 
specifically, of original public meaning originalism: “What I look for in 
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original 
meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”12 In his 
view, “the Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not 
that between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather that 
between original meaning . . . and current meaning.”13 He urged that the 
purpose of this approach to constitutional interpretation and application is 
the obstruction of modernity and the preservation of past values.
14
  
Justice Scalia also observed that the “greatest defect” of originalism “is 
the difficulty of applying it correctly” as “it is often exceedingly difficult 
to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.”15 Originalism, 
done correctly, “requires the consideration of an enormous mass of 
material” and “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we 
have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, 
philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day.”16 In 
 
 
of Education was wrongly decided” and they “concoct implausible accounts of the Reconstruction Era 
understanding of segregation.”).  
 11. In addition to originalism, Justice Scalia also employed two other interpretive 
methodologies—textualism and traditionalism—in deciding constitutional cases. See Ronald Turner, 
Were Separate-But-Equal and Antimiscegenation Laws Constitutional?: Applying Scalian 
Traditionalism to Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 285, 289 n.23 (2003). Michael W. 
McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1137 n.45 
(1998) (noting that “these aspects of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence are sometimes in tension,” Michael 
McConnell has noted that “by failing to articulate the connection between these methods, or to explain 
how to decide cases when they are in conflict, Justice Scalia leaves himself open to the charge of 
inconsistency.”). For more on textualist, originalist, and traditionalist judging, see Richard A. Primus, 
Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 159 (2009).  
 12. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  
 13. Id.; see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A 
SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987) (an interpreter must ask “What was the most plausible meaning of the 
words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it—regardless of what the Framers might secretly 
have intended?”).  
 14. See Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER 
OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995).  
 15. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989). 
 16. Id. at 856–57. Elsewhere I referred to and quoted Justice Scalia’s immersion analysis. See 
Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist Defense of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 170, 175 (2014). Reacting to and criticizing this point in a blog 
posting, Lawrence Solum argued that the immersive originalism approach and examination of the 
“prevalent political and intellectual atmosphere” constitutes an unjustifiable “‘public atmosphere 
originalism.’” Lawrence Solum, Turner on Scalia & Brown v. Board, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Feb. 4, 
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addition, Justice Scalia occasionally employed “no one” originalism, as he 
did in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, the recent Court decision 
striking down state-law bans on same-sex marriage: “When the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man 
and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That 
resolves these cases.”17  
Did Justice Scalia believe that originalism could pass the “acid test” 
and “justify what is now almost universally regarded as the Supreme 
Court’s finest hour: its decision in Brown”?18 In Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Scalia and his co-author Bryan 
Garner noted that a “frequent line of attack against originalism consists in 
appeals to popular Supreme Court decisions assertedly based on a 
rejection of original understanding.”19 Pointing to Brown as the most oft-
cited exemplar of the assertion that “only nonoriginalism could have 
produced . . . [the] generally acclaimed results,”20 Justice Scalia and 
Garner wrote that Brown “purported to rely on public education’s new 
importance, its changed place in American life throughout the nation.”21 
But, they stated, “it is far from clear—indeed, it is probably not true—that 
the [Brown] Court’s reliance on changed times was necessary.”22 In Scalia 
and Garner’s view: 
The text of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and in 
particular the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws 
designed to assert the separateness and superiority of the white race, 
even those that purport to treat the races equally. Justice John 
Marshall Harlan took this position in his powerful (and thoroughly 
 
 
2015) http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/02/turner-on-scalia-brown-v-board.html. As the call 
for consideration of “the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time” was made not by me but by 
Justice Scalia, Solum’s argument/complaint regarding what he (and not I) labeled “public atmosphere 
originalism” takes issue with Justice Scalia’s own words and originalist analysis and not some made-
up and new-fangled theory of my purported creation.  
 17. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Antonin 
Scalia, CALIF. LAWYER (Jan. 2011), http://www.callawyer.com/2011/01/antonin-scalia/ (“In 1868 . . . 
I don’t think anybody would have thought that equal protection applied to sex discrimination, or 
certainly not to sexual orientation. . . . Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the 
basis of sex. The only issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. . . . Nobody ever voted for that.” 
 18. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
105 (1992). 
 19. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 87 (2012). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 87–88. 
 22. Id. at 88. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/5
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originalist) dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Recent research 
persuasively establishes that this was the original understanding of 
the post-Civil War Amendments.
23
  
Justice Scalia and Garner thus posited that one can reasonably believe that, 
upon adoption, the 1865 Thirteenth Amendment and the 1868 Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited any and all white-supremacist and separationist 
laws. They contend, moreover, that this blanket prohibition is supported 
by the first Justice Harlan’s “thoroughly originalist” dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.
24
 If this is correct (I argue herein that it is not), a straight line 
can be drawn (1) from the texts of the amendments (2) through Justice 
Harlan’s 1896 Plessy dissent (3) to Brown’s 1954 invalidation of the 
separate-but-equal doctrine in the context of public school education.  
This essay examines Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s originalist 
justification of Brown
25
 and concludes that their analysis is flawed in at 
least three respects. First, as discussed in Part I, Justice Scalia’s and 
Garner’s reading of the texts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments is atextual, acontextual, and ahistorical and does not 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that “all laws designed to assert the 
separateness and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to 
treat the races equally,”26 were prohibited in 1865 and 1868. The 
Thirteenth Amendment’s formal prohibition of slavery and involuntary 
servitude says nothing regarding the constitutionality of segregation laws. 
Further, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly contain 
the word “race,” nor does it expressly command racial equality or 
“unambiguously forbid racial segregation.”27 And importantly, the 
Scalia/Garner analysis does not explain, let alone consider, the legal and 
analytical irrelevance of, the Reconstruction-era civil/political/social rights 
trichotomy.
28
 That trichotomy distinguished between civil rights protected 
by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, political rights protected 
 
 
 23. Id. (citing Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995)). 
 24. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
 25. In focusing solely herein on the specifics of Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s attempt to provide 
an originalist justification for Brown, I of course know that other originalist scholars have proffered 
their own analyses and justifications for the Court’s decision. See Ronald Turner, On Brown v. Board 
of Education and Discretionary Originalism, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1143, 1180–98. Those other efforts 
must be critiqued and investigated on their own terms and analyzed in all their particulars and are 
beyond the scope of this project. 
 26. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 88. 
 27. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONAE 12 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2015). 
 28. See infra notes 92–128 and accompanying text. 
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by the Fifteenth Amendment, and social rights beyond the protective scope 
of the Civil War Amendments (such as the right to marry a person of 
another race).
29
  
Second, Justice Scalia and Garner problematically invoke Justice 
Harlan’s Plessy dissent as support for their argument that originalism 
would have produced Brown’s result. As explored in Part II, the consensus 
regarding the then-extant legal understandings of “rights” in post-Civil 
War America are on display in Justice Harlan’s opinion. As found in that 
opinion, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments protected civil rights, 
and the Fifteenth Amendment outlawed racial discrimination in voting. 
Distinguishing protected civil rights from social rights not falling under 
the Reconstruction amendments’ mandates, Justice Harlan made clear his 
view that “social equality cannot exist between black and white races in 
this country”30 and denied that racial integration implied social rights or 
social equality. His understanding that not all categories of rights were 
protected by the Civil War amendments is in tension with Justice Scalia’s 
and Garner’s argument and contradicts their thesis. And, as noted in Part 
III’s discussion of Brown, Justice Harlan’s dissent played no role 
whatsoever—indeed it was not even mentioned—in the Court’s 1954 
invalidation of the separate-but-equal doctrine in the public schools. As 
Justice Harlan viewed racial integration in public schools as a social and 
not a civil right, Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s reliance on Harlan’s Plessy 
dissent, as evidence that Harlan would have reached the same result 
reached by the Brown Court in 1954, is misplaced. 
Third, Justice Scalia and Garner cite one 1995 article, Michael 
McConnell’s Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, in support of 
their effort to justify Brown.
31
 Part IV highlights the notable absence of 
any reference to other scholarship critiquing and finding unpersuasive the 
analysis set forth in that article, including observations that McConnell 
focuses, not on the 1866-1868 framing and ratification period of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but on post-ratification views of members of 
 
 
 29. See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2012) (The 
Reconstruction era Congress did not protect “social rights (of which the clearest example was the right 
to marry a person of another race).”); Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind 
Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71, 130 n.241 (2013) (“Another possible reason why marriage 
would not be covered by the Fourteenth Amendment is that it was regarded as a social right rather than 
a civil right.”); McConnell, supra note 10, at 1018 (“A significant undercurrent in the discussion of 
social rights was the fear that intermixing would lead to miscegenation, and that the theory of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . would logically extend to a right of racial intermarriage.”). 
 30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 31. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 88 n.41. 
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Congress and “[i]ronically . . . on the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which should be anathema to Scalia.”32 
The essay concludes with brief summary remarks.  
I. THE ATEXTUAL, ACONTEXTUAL, AND AHISTORICAL READINGS OF THE 
THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
A. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Text and Context 
1. The Thirteenth Amendment  
“The question that galvanized the 39th Congress into action on the 
issue of ‘civil rights’ was the prospective eradication of African American 
slavery and what had come to be called its ‘badges and incidents.’”33 That 
galvanization resulted in the framing and 1865 adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution
34
: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  
While the amendment’s text expressly abolished slavery, it made no 
reference to freedmens’ post-emancipation, constitutionally-protected 
rights and freedom from then-extant racial segregation. Whether the 
amendment was to be read broadly as a provision “establishing African 
Americans’ civil and even political rights as well as abolishing slavery,” 
or narrowly as a provision limited to the abolition of slavery, was debated 
 
 
 32. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. 
 33. G. Edward White, The Origins of Civil Rights in America, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 771 
(2014). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The amendment’s exception for the punishment of those duly 
convicted of a crime “was a gaping hole—one big enough to allow the re-establishment of slavery by 
another name.” IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 39 (2014). African Americans convicted of 
crimes were heavily fined and many were leased by states to railroads and companies until the fine 
was paid. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008). 
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prior to ratification.
35
 “For many white Americans, the elimination of 
slavery meant” the latter “and nothing more.”36  
The Thirteenth Amendment’s formal prohibition of slavery and 
emancipation of enslaved persons was met by a backlash of violence, 
white vigilantism, and the paramilitary Ku Klux Klan’s campaign of 
intimidation, terror, and murder.
37
 “Black Codes,” state laws enacted 
across the south by former Confederates,
38
 returned freedpersons to “a 
condition as close to their former one as it was possible to get without 
actually reinstituting slavery[,]”39 if not worse.40 The Black Codes were 
designed “to retain a coercive, race-based labor system by denying or 
restricting blacks from contract rights, property ownership, legal recourse 
and access to courts, freedom of travel, control over their own labor, and 
rights of family and relationships.”41  
The Black Codes’ overtly white-supremacist legal regime was hailed 
and viewed positively by Columbia University professor (and at one time 
president of both the American Historical Association and the American 
Political Science Association) William Archibald Dunning.
42
 In his 1907 
book on Reconstruction, Dunning stated that the Black Codes were  
in the main a conscientious straightforward attempt to bring some 
sort of order out of the social and economic chaos which a full 
acceptance of the results of war and emancipation involved. . . . The 
freedmen were not, and in the nature of the case could not for 
generations be, on the same social, moral, and intellectual plane 
 
 
 35. LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 103 
(2015); see also PAUL D. MORENO, BLACK AMERICANS AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEW HISTORY 19 
(2006) (“The civil and political status of the freedmen remained unclear at war’s end, it being 
uncertain whether the Thirteenth Amendment did anything more than abolish the legal condition of 
chattel slavery.”). 
 36. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 103. 
 37. See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE 
RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 267, 276–80 (2003). 
 38. See DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF, VIOLENT HISTORY 
OF AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 171 (2014). 
 39. NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 34 (2006). 
 40. See WILLIAM A. SINCLAIR, THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY: A STUDY OF THE CONDITION AND 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 74 (1905) (Southerners used the Black Codes “to suppress 
the colored man” and “make his condition worse under emancipation than it was under slavery, 
depriving him of every protection, making him an outcast”). 
 41. James W. Fox Jr., Publics, Meanings & the Privileges of Citizenship, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 
567, 584 (2015). 
 42. See Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 523 
n.12 (1989). 
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with the whites; and this fact was recognized by constituting them a 
separate class of the civil order.
43
 
Dunning “treated the period of ‘Radical Reconstruction’ . . . as a 
nightmarish mistake whose horrors exceeded those of the Civil War.”44 As 
noted by Eric Foner, the “Dunning school of Reconstruction 
historiography” assumed “‘negro incapacity’” and “portrayed African 
Americans either as ‘children,’ ignorant dupes manipulated by 
unscrupulous whites, or as savages, their primal passions unleashed by the 
end of slavery.”45 Dunning “equated an egalitarian, color-blind franchise 
with black domination, praising those whites who, subjugated by 
adversaries of their own race, thwarted the scheme which threatened 
permanent subjection to another race.”46 
The Thirteenth Amendment also provides that “Congress shall have 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”47 Exercising that 
power for the first time, Congress overrode the veto of white supremacist 
and “fervent Negrophobe” President Andrew Johnson48 and enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Seeking to “destroy all these discriminations” 
found in the Blacks Codes,
49
 Section 1 of the legislation provided: 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to 
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full 
 
 
 43. WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, 1865–
1877, at 58 (1907). 
 44. LEMANN, supra note 39, at 122. 
 45. ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xxii 
(2005); see also W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 641–43 (2013) (discussing 
Dunning’s attack on Reconstruction). 
 46. EGERTON, supra note 38, at 327 (quotation marks omitted). 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. 
 48. RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE 
OBAMA PRESIDENCY 42 (2011); see also ANNETTE GORDON-REED, ANDREW JOHNSON: THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS SERIES 124 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds., 2011). 
 49. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). 
Drafters of the Civil Rights Act used the Black Codes as models for the legislation and “made it clear 
that the Act overrode any black codes to the contrary.” G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY, VOLUME TWO: FROM RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE 1920S 19 (2016). 
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and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.
50
  
The Act defined United States citizenship and set forth a list of civil rights 
granted to and enjoyed by citizens “of every race and color” born in the 
United States and its territories. That list “reflected those rights that had 
been deemed so valuable to the white South that they needed to be denied 
to blacks.”51 As explained by Senator and Judiciary Committee chair 
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the Act was “confined exclusively to civil 
rights and nothing else, no political and no social rights.”52 Not included in 
the list of protected rights were “voting rights, rights to travel and reside 
within a state, rights to equal taxes, or rights to acquire and to pursue 
happiness.”53 Thus, “[i]n 1866 there was no place for black suffrage in the 
claim of full citizenship, and certainly no space for ‘social’ citizenship, for 
equal access to public spaces in a way that would accord full civil status to 
black citizens.”54 The 1866 Act “stopped well short of protecting full 
participation in public life.”55  
 
 
 50. 14 STAT. 27, § 1 (1866). A prior version of the bill provided that “[t]here shall be no 
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United States in any State or 
Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.” CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Kurt Lash reports that House sponsor James Wilson 
“stressed that the Act would leave the ‘political right’ of suffrage ‘under the control of the several 
States,’” and that the proposed statute would not “force racial integration of juries and schools because 
they are not civil rights or immunities.” KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP 120 (2014) (brackets omitted). Wilson deleted the “civil 
rights and immunities” phrase from the legislation so as to “obviate . . . the difficulty growing out of 
any other construction beyond the specific rights named in the section . . .” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1367 (1866); LASH, supra, at 134. 
 51. Fox, supra note 41, at 585. 
 52. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). 
 53. White, supra note 33, at 773; GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF 
SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 54 (2013) 
(“Political rights did not make the list of protected civil rights, either under the traditional definition or 
under the 1866 Act, and in this respect, the act followed the black codes in rejecting any attempt to 
achieve political equality.”). 
 54. James Fox, Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship and the Reconstruction-Era Black Public 
Sphere, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1257 (2009) (bracketed material added). 
 55. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 11. 
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2. The Fourteenth Amendment 
Responding to concerns about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866,
56
 the 39th Congress proposed and in 1868 the nation ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
57
 Section 1 of the 
Amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
58
 
The first sentence of Section 1 overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford
59
 and 
restated the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s definition of United States citizenship, 
with an important addition: persons not born but naturalized in the United 
States are also citizens. The second sentence “connected citizenship to 
civil rights, turning the Civil Rights Act’s lengthy list of guarantees into 
more general promises of equity.”60 
Notably absent from the text of Section 1 is the term “race.” This was 
not an accident or oversight. In drafting Section 1, the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction considered but declined to include the 
following language: “No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by 
the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”61 This language was successfully 
opposed by Republicans who were “apparently too leery of seeming too 
attached to black interests, and they probably wanted to protect white 
 
 
 56. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 35 
n.29 (2011) (“[I]t is the consensus view of historians that Republicans passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment in part to remove all doubt about its constitutionality.”); accord John O. McGinnis & 
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1762 (2010); David 
A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (2015). 
 57. On the ratification of the amendment, see infra notes 56–72 and accompanying text. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868). 
 59. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(1868); see infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 60. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 105. 
 61. BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 296 (1914). 
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unionists in the South from oppression by reconstructed state governments 
controlled by ex-Confederates.”62  
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment’s text “unambiguously forbid 
racial segregation”63 or facially require racial or other forms of equality. 
Rather, the text prohibits, among other things, state denial of the “equal 
protection of the laws,” a vague phrase64 that does not seem “to forbid 
separation, even separation on grounds ordinarily considered invidious, 
such as sex and race.”65 Staring at the “cryptic language” of the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause does not inexorably reveal an express no-
segregation mandate or a clear textual answer to the question whether 
state-required racial segregation violates the Constitution.
66
  
Context pertinent to the adoption and understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment must also be considered. The amendment was proposed by a 
“partial, ‘rump’ Congress . . . devoid of Southern representation.”67 As the 
post-Civil War readmission of Confederate states into the Union was 
conditioned on those states’ ratifications of the amendment,68 it has been 
remarked that the amendment was “forced down the throat of the southern 
political establishment”69 and “was ratified not by the collective assent of 
the American people, but rather at gunpoint.”70 At the time of its 
ratification in 1868, some derisively described the amendment as the 
“negro equalization amendment.”71 Southerners were “terrified” that 
 
 
 62. John Harrison, Time, Change, and the Constitution, 90 VA. L. REV. 1601, 1606–07 (2004);  
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 18 (2004) (arguing that some Radical Republicans opposed ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after the rejection of language prohibiting racial classifications “because they 
thought the amendment’s limited reach rendered it a party trick designed only for electioneering 
purposes”).  
 63. SUNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 12. 
 64. See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1375 (1990). 
 65. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 344 (2008); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 
12 (“[I]t is hardly clear that racial segregation counts” as a denial of equal protection). 
 66. VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 280. 
 67. Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1627, 1643 (2013). 
 68. See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States (Military 
Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (readmission of Confederate states into the United 
States would be permitted when those states established new governments and constitutions, ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and granted the right to vote to African Americans); GERARD N. 
MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 129–31 (2013). 
 69. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 1009 (2012). 
 70. Colby, supra note 67, at 1629; see also WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE 
SOUTH 14 (1960) (The Fourteenth Amendment was “adopted in . . . an uncivil, unrighteous and 
manifestly unconstitutional manner.”). 
 71. Colby, supra note 67, at 1647. 
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African Americans would be politically and socially equal to whites, that 
state laws prohibiting interracial marriage would be banned, and that 
whites would be forced “to live . . . with the sickening stench of degraded 
humanity.”72 
Also of relevance is the fact that Reconstruction was a “painful and 
embarrassing” failure.73 Developments in the early years of that era were 
positive, as African Americans were elected to Congress and to state 
legislatures and offices.
74
 But the desired hope and change did not last. In 
the 1876 presidential election, Democratic candidate Samuel J. Tilden won 
the popular vote and lost by one vote in the Electoral College to 
Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes. Democrats in Florida, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina challenged the election results, and 
Congress created a fifteen-member commission (comprised of ten 
Congressmen equally divided between the Democratic and Republican 
parties and five Supreme Court Justices) to resolve the dispute.
75
 With the 
deciding vote cast by commission member and Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican, the commission ruled in favor of 
Hayes.
76
 Hayes then promised Democrats that, in exchange for their 
acceptance of the commission’s decision, he would withdraw federal 
troops from the South and would not enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.
77
 Tilden electors from five 
southern states switched their votes to Hayes. Upon assuming the 
presidency, Hayes removed federal troops from the South, ending the 
federal government’s protection of African Americans there. In the 
aftermath of this deal 
every Southern state had fallen under the control of white opponents 
of Reconstruction who sought openly to reimpose the norms of 
racial subordination. Within two decades, they had succeeded 
overwhelmingly, erecting structures of racial oppression so 
entrenched and complex that they are still being undone.
78
  
 
 
 72. Id. at 1647 (noting the existence of these views). 
 73. Greene, supra note 69, at 981. 
 74. See KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 47–48. 
 75. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 579 
(updated ed. 2014); Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), Glittering Generalities and Historical Myths, 51 
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 419, 426–27 (2013). 
 76. See Stevens, supra note 75, at 427. 
 77. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 248–49 (2008); ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE 
CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876 (2003). 
 78. Stevens, supra note 75, at 533. On the entrenched impact and aspects of racial segregation 
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Though it is commonly remarked that the Hayes-Tilden Compromise 
marked the end of Reconstruction, the legal history of that period did not 
end in 1877; rather, this “episode in American legal and constitutional 
history . . . extended into the 1890s.”79 As a result of the Compromise, 
“Plessy and later cases were decided by Justices appointed by Democratic 
presidents, or Republicans after their party decided not to keep African 
American suffrage high on the list of priorities.”80 
B. The Scalia/Garner Textual Analysis and Argument 
With the foregoing backdrop in mind, attention now returns to the 
Scalia/Garner argument that the texts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments proscribed all white-supremacist and separationist laws. 
In Reading Law, Justice Scalia and Garner argue that the texts of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a basis for an originalist 
justification of Brown.
81
 Consider, first, the Thirteenth Amendment: 
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”82 While Court decisions 
issued in the 1870s and 1880s made declarations concerning the civil-
 
 
and subjugation, see RUTH THOMPSON-MILLER ET AL., JIM CROW’S LEGACY: THE LASTING IMPACT OF 
SEGREGATION (2015). 
 79. WHITE, supra note 49, at 6. 
 80. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 117 (2008). 
 81. This was not the first time that Justice Scalia found a justification for Brown in the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and invoked Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent as confirmatory support. In 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), Justice John Paul Stevens stated that “[i]f 
the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued acceptance, the constitutional 
attack on racial discrimination would, of course, have been doomed to failure.” Id. at 82 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). Justice Scalia retorted that the “customary invocation of Brown v. Board of Education as 
demonstrating the dangerous consequences of this principle is insupportable.” Id. at 95 n.1 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). In his view, “the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ 
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws 
treating people differently because of their race are invalid.” Id. Justice Scalia further argued that 
“even if one does not regard the Fourteenth Amendment as crystal clear on this point, a tradition of 
unchallenged validity did not exist with respect to the practice in Brown,” as the separate-but-equal 
doctrine was “vigorously opposed on constitutional grounds, litigated up to this Court, and upheld only 
over the dissent of one of our historically most respected Justices.” Id.  
 Justice Scalia is correct that racially segregated railway accommodations were challenged, albeit 
unsuccessfully, in Plessy. Of course, Homer Plessy’s unsuccessful challenge validated and left in place 
the separate-but-equal regime governing public transportation, and the issue of the constitutionality of 
that doctrine as applied in the separate and distinct public school context was not before the Court. In 
fact, and with no disagreement from Justice Harlan, state-mandated racial segregation in public 
schools was cited by the seven-Justice Plessy majority as support for the holding that segregated 
railway accommodations were constitutional. See infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.  
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (1865). 
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rights-protective purpose and meaning of this amendment,
83
 the text itself 
says nothing regarding the constitutionality of segregation laws falling 
outside the amendment’s slavery/involuntary servitude scope. As for the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the text does not contain the word “race,”84 does 
not expressly “or unambiguously forbid racial segregation,”85 and does not 
(as Justice Scalia once stated) “explicitly establish[] racial equality as a 
constitutional value.”86 As Michael Dorf has observed, that statement by 
Justice Scalia is “entirely wrong” and “is a mind-blowing whopper of an 
error.”87 The textual prohibition of denial of “the equal protection of the 
laws” does not expressly mandate racial equality and prohibit racial 
segregation, and “‘separate but equal’ is consistent at the textual originalist 
level with ‘equal protection.’”88  
In sum, the texts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment, read 
separately or together, do not unequivocally state and cannot reasonably 
be viewed as communicating a blanket constitutional prohibition of “all 
laws designed to assert the separateness and superiority of the white 
race. . .”89 Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s textual-originalist 
reading of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments is a misreading 
grounded on the erroneous premise that those provisions invalidated all 
apartheidic laws in one fell swoop.  
C. The Civil/Political/Social Rights Trichotomy 
An informed analysis of the Scalia/Garner thesis must go beyond the 
text of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and consider the 
 
 
 83. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “passed in view 
of the thirteenth amendment,” sought to secure to all citizens “those fundamental rights which are the 
essence of civil freedom, namely, the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens”). 
 84. See Andrew Koppelman, Passive Aggressive: Scalia and Garner on Interpretation, 41 
BOUNDARY 2: INT’L LITERATURE & CULTURE 227, 230 (2014). 
 85. Sunstein, supra note 27, at 12. 
 86. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 87. Michael Dorf, A Text So Clear It’s Invisible, Dorf on Law (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/07/a-text-so-clear-its-invisible.html.  
 88. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 344 (2013). See also Posner, supra note 32 
(“In 1868 . . . “equal protection of the laws” meant that states . . . must not deny legal protection to the 
newly freed slaves (and to blacks more generally). In particular, states could not, without facing legal 
consequences, turn a blind eye to the Ku Klux Klan’s campaign of intimidation of blacks and 
carpetbaggers. Had the provision been thought, in 1868, to forbid racial segregation of public schools, 
it would not have been ratified.”). 
 89. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 88. 
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historical context relative to their adoption, including the Reconstruction-
era civil/political/social rights trichotomy mentioned in this section.  
In the antebellum United States, “rights” were conceptualized and 
divided into three categories: civil, political, and social. Discussing the 
first two categories in Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court stated, “Civil 
rights belong equally to all. Every one has the right to acquire property, 
and even in infants the laws of all governments preserve this. But political 
rights are matters of practical utility. A right to vote comes under this 
class.”90 In 1854, Abraham Lincoln made clear that “his ‘own feelings’ did 
not embrace making former slaves ‘politically and socially our equals’”91 
and he later declared “his opposition to negro suffrage, and to everything 
looking towards placing negroes upon a footing of political and social 
equality with the whites . . . .”92 Thereafter, in 1857, the Court issued its 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
93
 a case that has been described as “the 
original sin of originalism.”94 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Roger Brooke Taney, held that Africans and their descendants were not 
and could not be citizens of the United States.
95
 The Court further declared 
that enslaved persons were “beings of an inferior order . . . altogether unfit 
to associate with the white race”96 and were “so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”97 These purportedly 
“inferior” persons “were not even in the minds of the framers of the 
Constitution when they were conferring special rights and privileges upon 
the citizens of a State . . .”98  
During the Civil War era, the question whether social rights should be 
granted to African Americans was contemplated as “the possibility of 
ending chattel slavery became more immediate. As the question of what 
 
 
 90. 48 U.S. 1, 28 (1849). 
 91. Kate Masur, Civil, Political, and Social Equality After Lincoln: A Paradigm and a 
Problematic, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2010) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, 
Illinois, Ill. J., Oct l 21, 1854), reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 247, 
256 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953)). 
 92. Pamela Brandwein, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 27 (1999). 
 93. 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (1868). 
 94. B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional 
Change, and the ‘Pragmatic Moment,’ 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1833 (2013). Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.51 (2009) (“Given the universal opprobrium that 
attaches to Dred Scott, it is unsurprising that Originalists would seek to disavow it.”). 
 95. 60 U.S. at 404. 
 96. Id. at 407. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 412; see also id. (“Indeed, when we look to the condition of this race in the several 
States at the time, it was impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be 
extended to them.”). 
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freedom meant became more pressing, the concept of social equality 
gained currency.”99 In the aftermath of the Civil War, the 
civil/political/social rights trichotomy was the subject of debates over 
Reconstruction reforms and policies.
100
 While “[m]ost white Southerners 
simply dismissed the notion that blacks were entitled to equal rights,”101 
“most Republicans . . . adhered to a political vocabulary inherited from the 
antebellum era, which distinguished sharply between . . . civil, political, 
and social rights.”102  
As discussed above,
103
 the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
protected civil rights. The “rights that most obviously had to be extended 
to blacks if the Slave Power were to be dismantled were the rights of 
contract, property, personal mobility, and access to law, and those rights 
were from the very beginning classified as ‘civil.’”104 Those two 
amendments did not cover or protect political rights, such as the right to 
vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment.
105
 As for the “very 
amorphous area called social rights or social equality . . . [n]obody who 
was talking about the Fourteenth Amendment except Charles Sumner 
believed in social equality.”106  
Numerous scholars recognize the Reconstruction-era rights trichotomy. 
As noted by Bruce Ackerman: 
For Reconstruction Republicans, only three spheres of life were 
worth distinguishing: the political sphere, which involved voting 
and the like; the civil sphere, which included the legal protection of 
life and liberty; and the social sphere, which involved everything 
else. Within this traditional trichotomy, the Reconstruction 
 
 
 99. BRANDWEIN, supra note 56, at 70. 
 100. See id. 
 101. JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1997). 
 102. FONER, supra note 75, at 231.  
 103. See supra notes 51–55, 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 104. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 159 (1999). 
 105. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (1870) (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”). That the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide and protect the right to vote 
is evidenced by § 2 of the amendment, which provides that when the right to vote “is denied to any 
male inhabitants of [a] State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States . . . the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.” Id., 
amend. XIV, § 2 (1868).  
 106. Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conversation with Eric 
Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 438 (2005–2006). 
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Amendments protected political and civil rights but not social 
rights.
107
  
Michael Klarman has noted the separate and distinct categories of 
Reconstruction-era rights. Civil rights included “freedom of contract, 
property ownership, and court access—rights guaranteed in the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act, for which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to provide 
a secure constitutional foundation.”108 Political rights, “such as voting or 
jury service,” were not enjoyed by all citizens,109 and racial discrimination 
in voting was prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment. Social rights “such 
as interracial marriage or school integration” were resisted by many, 
including by some Republicans.
110
  
On the Reconstruction-era rights distinction, Eric Foner observed: 
Equality in civil rights—equal treatment by the courts and civil and 
criminal laws—most Republicans now deemed nearly as essential, 
for an individual’s natural rights could not be secured without it. 
Although Radicals insisted black suffrage must be a part of 
Reconstruction, the vote was commonly considered a “privilege” 
rather than a right; requirements varied from state to state, and 
unequal treatment or even complete exclusion did not compromise 
one’s standing as a citizen. And social relations—the choice of 
business and personal associates—most Americans deemed a 
personal matter, outside the purview of government. Throughout 
Reconstruction, indeed, the term “social equality” conjured up 
fantastic images of blacks forcing their way into whites’ private 
clubs, homes, and bedrooms.
111
 
Consider Pamela Brandwein’s description of the trichotomy: 
Civil rights pertained to the economic sphere and were regarded as 
basic and fundamental. Political rights (or political privileges, as 
they were sometimes called) were granted by the political collective 
and were not seen (initially) as necessary for freedom. The social 
rights category designated a sphere in which “association” took 
 
 
 107. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 130 (2014). 
 108. KLARMAN, supra note 62, at 19. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 325 (“Many 
northern Republicans in 1866 continued to resist the extension to blacks of either equal political rights 
. . . or social rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration.”). 
 111. FONER, supra note 75, at 231. 
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place. There was a consensus that social equality could not be 
maintained by legislation.
112
 
Social rights were “a matter of social standing” of blacks as determined by 
whites; that category “delimit[ed] a sphere where racial caste was 
maintained.”113 Social rights thus “fell under state control in some way” 
and it was understood that the state could prohibit social equality in the 
areas of interracial mixing “in public places like schools and railroad cars 
or in marriage.”114 
Also noting the distinction between civil, political, and social rights at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Michael 
McConnell wrote that  
[t]he “social rights” argument was based on a tripartite division of 
rights, universally accepted at the time but forgotten today, between 
civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Supporters and 
opponents. . . agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment had no 
bearing on “social rights.” . . . To the Republicans of the 
Reconstruction period, equality of civil rights was not necessarily 
linked to equality in general, and particularly not to social 
equality.
115
  
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment “did not require equality with respect to 
everything, but only with respect to civil rights, the ‘privileges or 
immunities of citizens,’” McConnell observed, and “[i]t was generally 
understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied only to ‘civil rights.’ Political and social rights, it was 
agreed, were not civil rights and were not protected.”116 Though this 
tripartite division of rights “plays no part in current interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” it “forms the essential framework for 
interpreting the Amendment as it was originally understood.”117 
The Reconstruction-era trichotomy is on display in Jack Balkin’s 
“tripartite theory of citizenship.” The “key point of the tripartite theory 
was that equal citizenship and equality before the law meant something 
less than what it does for us today: civil equality, but not political or social 
 
 
 112. BRANDWEIN, supra note 56, at 71. 
 113. Id. at 72. 
 114. LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 81 
(1999). 
 115. McConnell, supra note 10, at 1016 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 1024. 
 117. Id. at 1025. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
198 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:179 
 
 
 
 
equality.”118 Balkin contends that, unlike Radical Republicans who sought 
full equality for African Americans,
119
 the majority of Republican 
members of Congress who voted for the proposed Fourteenth Amendment 
were moderates or conservatives who “did not want to give blacks the 
right to vote,” “did not consider blacks to be full social equals with 
whites,” and “believed that states should still be able to restrict interracial 
marriage and perhaps even segregate some public facilities.”120 The notion 
that the social rights of African American would receive constitutional 
protection “would have been politically explosive.”121 
That the civil/political/social rights trichotomy was a known and 
significant feature of the Reconstruction era is a “familiar and important 
point[]”122 long recognized by many scholars.123 A now forgotten 
 
 
 118. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 222–23 (2011). 
 119. See id. at 223. 
 120. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
146 (2011). 
 121. BALKIN, supra note 118, at 223. 
 122. Strauss, supra note 29, at 1169. 
 123. In addition to the scholars discussed above, see WHITE, supra note 49, at 11 (In the 
Reconstruction era “[m]ost Americans drew a distinction between ‘civil’ and what was termed ‘social’ 
rights” and “did not anticipate the federal government’s enforcing the compulsory integration of blacks 
and white[s] in nearly all aspects of public life.”); BOND, supra note 102, at 7 (During Reconstruction 
debates southerners “sharply distinguished among civil, political, and social equality.”); ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 1 (1996) (noting the post-Civil War 
“distinction between social and political equality, and the exclusion of the former from 
antidiscrimination concerns”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Laws, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2014) (Most participants in Reconstruction-era 
debates in Congress “agreed that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments” and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 “focused on protecting civil rights . . . and no provision of federal law protected equality in 
social rights.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2012) (noting “the basic compromise underlying the Reconstruction 
Amendments[,]” which is that “Blacks were entitled to civil equality, such as the right to make 
contracts and own property, but not social equality—that is, the right to associate with whites as 
equals”); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 413 (2011) (Reconstruction 
Republicans were concerned with eliminating discrimination in civil rights, “not with what many 
would have then called ‘social’ rights such as the right to associate freely, even in public or quasi-
public institutions.”); Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011) 
(During the Reconstruction era “courts assessed the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws by 
determining whether such laws conferred civil, political, and social rights.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal 
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 974 n.67 (2002) (“[S]ocial rights” were “sometimes 
said to be entirely outside the purview” of the Fourteenth Amendment.); David E. Bernstein, Buchanan 
v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 823 (1998) (The “Court’s distinction 
between social rights, which were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and civil rights, which 
redemptionwere protected, was arguably consistent with the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 291 
(1998) (“Through most of Reconstruction and the years that followed, it was generally understood that 
blacks were constitutionally entitled to the same civil rights as whites but not necessarily to the same 
social and political rights.”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1207, 1208–09 (1992) (The Fourteenth 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/5
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“nineteenth-century vocabulary of rights” that “has disappeared from 
common usage,”124 the trichotomy must not be forgotten or ignored. As 
demonstrated, social rights and social equality—including the claimed 
right to attend a desegregated public school—were viewed as involving 
matters outside the protective scope of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
The phrase “social right” had a “racially charged meaning” and was 
viewed as “a code word for miscegenation and racial intermarriage. The 
idea (or rather the fear) was that the relative status of blacks and whites as 
a group would be altered if society had a preponderance of mixed-race 
children, or if blacks and whites regarded themselves as members of the 
same family.”125 
Social equality “was a label . . . enemies had long attempted to pin on 
the proponents of equal public rights in order to associate public rights 
with private intimacy and thereby to trigger the host of fears connected 
with the image of black men in physical proximity to white women.”126 
Any analysis of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments’ textual 
meanings that does not take into account the historical fact and legal 
significance of the civil/political/social rights trichotomy is foundationally 
and analytically deficient. 
II. PLESSY AND THE HARLAN DISSENT  
Justice Scalia and Garner contend that their thesis that originalism 
produces Brown’s result is supported by Justice Harlan’s “powerful (and 
 
 
Amendment protected civil but not social rights.); Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment on Professor Van 
Alstyne’s Paper, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1310 (1987) (referring to the 39th Congress and “the general 
understanding then that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment embraced only civil rights, not political 
and social rights”); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal 
Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 AM. J. HIST. 884, 886 (1987) 
(“The lawmakers who discussed equality during Reconstruction accepted midcentury conceptions that 
distinguished equality with respect to civil rights, to social rights, and to political rights.”); Alfred 
Avins, Social Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 HOUS. L. REV. 640, 655 (1967) 
(Reconstruction Republicans “consistently disclaimed any intention of enacting social equality.”); 
John P. Frank & Robert Munro, The Original Understanding of the Equal Protection of the Laws, 50 
COLUM. L. REV. 131, 148 (1950) (“[T]here are two kinds of relations of men, those that are controlled 
by the law and those that are controlled by purely personal choice. The former involves civil rights, the 
latter social rights.”). 
 124. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 115, at 81. 
 125. BALKIN, supra note 121, at 145. 
 126. Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the Plessy 
Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008); see also Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 
(1997) (“Social rights were those forms of association that, white Americans feared, would obliterate 
status distinctions and result in ‘amalgamation’ of the races.”). 
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thoroughly originalist) dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.”127 As discussed in 
this part, Justice Harlan’s dissent complicates the Scalia/Garner argument, 
contradicts their thesis, and provides no jurisprudential support for the 
result reached in Brown. Before turning to Plessy and Justice Harlan’s 
dissent, a brief discussion of the Justice’s pre-Plessy views on the meaning 
and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment may be helpful. 
A. Prefatory Note on Justice Harlan’s Pre-Plessy Fourteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
In Pace v. Alabama
128
 a unanimous Court, Justice Harlan included, 
rejected an equal protection challenge to a state law providing that any 
white person and black person who “intermarry or live in adultery or 
fornication with each other” would, upon conviction, be imprisoned for 
not less than two or more than seven years.
129
 A separate section of the law 
provided that any man and woman convicted for the first time of 
fornication or living together in adultery could be fined not less than one 
hundred dollars and imprisoned not more than six months.
130
 The law thus 
punished different-race couples convicted of adultery or fornication more 
severely than same-race couples convicted of the same offenses. Tony 
Pace, an African-American man, and Mary J. Cox, a white woman, were 
convicted of living together in a state of adultery or fornication, and each 
was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in an Alabama penitentiary. 
Their conviction and incarceration did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Court concluded, because “both offenders, the white and the 
black,” received the same sentence.131 Under this equal application 
analysis, the different punishments were “directed against the offense 
designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The 
punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the 
same.”132 As noted by one commentator, the challenged law involved 
“paradigmatic issues of social equality” and “the power of states to 
 
 
 127. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 88. 
 128. 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled in part by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 129. 106 U.S. at 583 (quoting Ala. Code § 4189). 
 130. See id. (noting Ala. Code § 4184). 
 131. Id. at 585. 
 132. Id. In 1964, the Court rejected this equal application analysis: Pace “represents a limited 
view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of 
this Court.” McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964). 
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regulate them was (presumably) unaffected by the Reconstruction 
Amendments and hence states could discourage mixing of the races.”133  
In The Civil Rights Cases
134
 the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875’s prohibition of racial discrimination in public 
accommodations.
135
 (Interestingly, as initially proposed, the law would 
have prohibited racial discrimination in public schools. That prohibition 
was opposed and the provision stricken prior to its 1875 enactment.)
136
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley
137
 opined that the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments did not empower Congress to enact the 
challenged legislation. He determined that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
“passed in view of the thirteenth amendment,” sought to secure to all 
citizens “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, 
namely, the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.”138 Congress “did not assume, under the 
authority given by the thirteenth amendment, to adjust what may be called 
the social rights of men and races in the community . . .”139 An 
 
 
 133. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 707 (2005). 
 134. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 135. See 18 Stat. 335 (1875).  
 136. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 88; Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition?: The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1539 (2012). 
 137. Recall that Justice Bradley was a member of the commission deciding the Hayes-Tilden 
election dispute who cast the deciding vote in favor of the Republican candidate Hayes.  
 138. 109 U.S. at 22. 
 139. Id. at 23. Justice Bradley had earlier expressed his view that social rights were distinct from 
legally protected civil rights in 1876 correspondence with Justice William Woods. Bradley wrote: 
Surely Congress cannot guaranty to the colored people admission to every place of gathering 
and amusement. To deprive white people of the right of choosing their own company would 
be to introduce another kind of slavery. . . . Surely a lady cannot be enforced by 
Congressional enactment to admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner party. 
. . . . 
 It never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to lodge and eat and sit with the 
negro. . .  . The antipathy of race cannot be crushed and annihilated by legal enactment. . . .  
The 13th amendment declares that slavery and involuntary servitude shall be abolished, and 
that Congress may enforce the enfranchisement of the slaves. Granted: but does freedom of 
the blacks require the slavery of the whites? An enforced fellowship would be that. The 14th 
amendment declares that no state shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. True. But is it a privilege and 
immunity of a colored citizen to sit and ride by the side of white persons? It declares that no 
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. But are they denied that protection 
when they are required to eat and sit and ride by themselves, and not with whites. . . . [S]urely 
it is no deprivation of civil right to give each race the right to choose their own company. 
White, supra note 49, at 39 (quoting CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, 
PART TWO 564 (1987)).  
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individual’s refusal to provide an accommodation to any person “has 
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude” prohibited by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley concluded.
140
  
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it 
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will 
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, 
or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.
141
 
Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley resolved that 
Section 1 prohibits state action and did not reach and regulate private 
rights: “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of 
the amendment.”142 The 1875 Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional, he 
opined, because it was not predicated on any state violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and was not corrective of constitutional wrongs 
committed by the states. “[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the 
constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful 
acts of individuals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, 
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.”143  
Justice Harlan dissented from the Court’s ruling. He agreed with the 
majority that the Thirteenth Amendment “established and decreed 
universal civil freedom throughout the United States” and that the rights 
specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited racial 
discrimination.
144
 Interestingly, Justice Harlan also agreed with Justice 
Bradley that “government has nothing to do with social, as distinguished 
from technically legal, rights of individuals.”145 In Justice Harlan’s words: 
No government ever has brought, or ever can bring, its people into 
social intercourse against their wishes. Whether one person will 
permit or maintain social relations with another is a matter with 
which government has no concern. I agree that if one citizen 
chooses not to hold social intercourse with another, he is not and 
cannot be made amenable to the law for his conduct in that regard; 
 
 
 140. 109 U.S. at 24. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 11; see also id. at 13 (The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment “are against state 
laws and acts done under state authority.”). 
 143. Id. at 17. 
 144. Id. at 35–36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 59. 
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for no legal right of a citizen is violated by the refusal of others to 
maintain merely social relations with him.
146
  
Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court, however, regarding the category 
in which to place the public accommodations right. For Justice Bradley, 
this was a social right not protected by the Constitution.
147
 For Justice 
Harlan, an African-American citizen’s use of a public highway on the 
same terms enjoyed by a white citizen was a constitutionally protected 
civil right,
148
 and was “no more a social right than his right, under the law, 
to use the public streets of a city, or a town, or a turnpike road, or a public 
market, or a post-office, or his right to sit in a public building with others, 
of whatever race, for the purpose of hearing the political questions of the 
day discussed.”149  
In Pace and The Civil Rights Cases Justice Harlan recognized and 
accepted the legal distinction between civil rights and social rights, a 
distinction “mark[ing] a sphere of associational freedom in which law 
would allow practices of racial discrimination to flourish.”150 He did not 
adopt and articulate a categorical constitutional ban of all laws segregating 
individuals on the basis of race in all spheres and contexts. 
B. The Plessy Majority Opinion 
Plessy v. Ferguson involved a constitutional challenge to the state of 
Louisiana’s Separate Car Law mandating “equal but separate 
accommodations for the white, and colored races” on railways cars 
carrying passengers in that state.
151
 Homer Plessy, a United States citizen 
who “was seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood,”152 paid 
for and sat in a vacant seat on a whites-only railway car. Ordered by the 
conductor to move to the coach “assigned to persons of the colored race,” 
Plessy refused and was forcibly removed and subsequently convicted of 
violating the separate-but-equal statute.
153
 
 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism 
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1827–28 (2006). 
 149. 109 U.S. at 59–60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 150. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 490 (2000). 
 151. 163 U.S. at 540 (quoting statute). 
 152. Id. at 541. See also BLISS BROYARD, ONE DROP: MY FATHER’S HIDDEN LIFE—A STORY OF 
RACE AND FAMILY SECRETS 280 (2007) (“Plessy looked white enough to enter the ‘whites only’ coach 
without calling attention to himself, but was black enough . . . to get himself arrested.”). 
 153. 163 U.S. at 542. 
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The Supreme Court rejected Plessy’s challenge. Writing for the Court 
and construing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Henry 
Billings Brown determined that there was no conflict between the former 
amendment and the state law. The legal distinction “founded in the color 
of the two races . . . must always exist so long as white men are 
distinguished from the other race by color.”154 That distinction “has no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a 
state of involuntary servitude.”155  
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brown declared that the  
object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute 
equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, 
it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon 
color, or to enforce social as distinguished from political, equality, 
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either.
156
 
“Laws permitting, and even requiring” the separation of blacks and whites 
“in places where they are liable to be brought into contact, do not 
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,” Justice Brown 
opined, “and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within 
the competency of state legislatures in the exercise of their police 
power.”157 He “consider[ed] the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be 
so,” the Justice stated, “it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.”158  
Justice Brown analogized the “social” segregation challenged by 
Homer Plessy to the “common instance” of “the establishment of separate 
schools for white and colored children” validated by courts in states 
“where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most 
earnestly enforced.”159 In his view, Louisiana’s separationist law was a 
“reasonable regulation,” and the state was “at liberty to act with reference 
 
 
 154. Id. at 543. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 544. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 551. 
 159. Id. at 544. Justice Brown also referred to laws prohibiting interracial marriage which “may be 
said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally 
recognized as within the police power of the state.” Id. at 545.  
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to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a 
view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public 
peace and good order.”160 Again buttressing his argument with a reference 
to racially segregated public schools, he wrote: 
[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the 
separation of the two races is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to 
the fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress requiring 
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, 
the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been 
questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.
161
 
Justice Brown also disagreed with the proposition that “social prejudices 
can be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to 
the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races.”162 Social 
equality was not a concern of government, he opined: 
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be 
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s 
merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals . . . When the 
government . . . has secured to each of its citizens equal rights 
before the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and 
progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was organized, 
and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with 
which it is endowed.
163
 
Leaving no doubt that the Reconstruction-era civil/political/social rights 
trichotomy informed the Court’s understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Brown concluded: “If the civil and political rights of 
both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or 
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of 
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”164 
C. Justice Harlan’s Plessy Dissent 
Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter in Plessy, made clear his view that 
“[i]n respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the constitution of the 
 
 
 160. Id. at 550. 
 161. Id. at 550–51. 
 162. Id. at 551. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added). 
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United States does not . . . permit any public authority to know the race of 
those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights.”165 Civil 
rights were protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination against citizens 
participating in the political control of the country.
166
 Barely mentioning 
the Equal Protection Clause,
167
 he opined that Louisiana’s Separate Car 
Law unconstitutionally interfered with Homer Plessy’s civil right to 
nondiscriminatory railway travel, thereby interfering with his personal 
freedom and liberty. 
The fundamental objection . . . to the statute is that it interferes with 
the personal freedom of citizens. Personal liberty . . . consists in the 
power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s 
person to whatsoever places one’s own inclination may direct, 
without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law. . . 
If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public 
conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no 
government, proceeding alone on the grounds of race, can prevent it 
without infringing the personal liberty of each.
168
 
Justice Harlan opined that “[e]very one knows that the statute in question 
had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from 
railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from 
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”169 The “real meaning” 
of the challenged law was to ensure that “inferior or degraded” African 
Americans could not sit in public coaches with whites.
170
 Louisiana’s 
separate-but-equal law violated Homer Plessy’s civil right to purchase a 
railroad ticket, and denied to him the equal right to enter into a contract 
with the railroad concerning the railway car he wished to occupy during 
his trip.
171
 This arbitrary separation of citizens on public highways on the 
 
 
 165. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 166. See id. at 555; see also id. at 556 (“[T]he constitution of the United States, in its present 
form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general 
government or the states against any citizen because of his race. All citizens are equal before the law.”) 
(quoting Gibson v. State, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896). 
 167. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan’s Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 962, 963 (“There is barely a mention of 
the Equal Protection Clause . . . other than a general reference to the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 168. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted). 
 169. Id.   
 170. Id. at 560. 
 171. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, David Souter’s Bad Constitutional History, 
WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2010), 2010 WLNR 12064730. 
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basis of race “is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil 
freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution.”172  
Justice Harlan then distinguished between civil rights and social rights 
when he addressed the argument, “scarcely worthy of consideration,” that 
“social equality cannot exist between the black and white races in this 
country.”173 He denied that racial integration implied social equality: 
“social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in a 
passenger coach or on a public highway than when members of the same 
races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box,” or attend a 
political assembly, use a town’s or city’s streets, find themselves in the 
same room when placing their names on a voting registry, or approach a 
ballot box.
174
 
A full and complete account of Justice Harlan’s dissent must consider 
other passages in his opinion. “Every man has pride of race,” he wrote, 
“and under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others, his 
equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express 
such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems 
proper.”175 And in a passage containing his well-known metaphor of a 
colorblind Constitution, he stated: 
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no 
caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all 
citizens are equal before the law.
176
  
This call for civil-rights colorblindness was immediately preceded by this 
passage: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, 
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty.
177
  
 
 
 172. 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 561. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 554. 
 176. Id. at 559 (emphasis added); see also id. (“The law regards man as man, and takes no account 
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the supreme law of the land 
are involved.”).  
 177. Id. 
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That this view and white-supremacist belief was expressed by the very 
same Justice who proclaimed that “our constitution is color-blind” 
illustrates the critical importance of an informed and nuanced account and 
understanding of Justice Harlan’s true views.178 Justice Harlan, a former 
slave owner who opposed the Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and the Freedmen’s Bureau,179 was not blind to race and was 
well aware of and endorsed white supremacy. “Thus, like most of his 
contemporaries, Harlan believed in the centrality of race and in the 
legitimacy of racial thinking . . . Although Harlan was highly unusual in 
the courage, integrity, and decency he showed in racial matters, he 
nonetheless also remained a person of his time.”180 This man, a person of 
his time, did not posit that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibited all white-supremacist and separationist laws; as he made clear 
in his Plessy dissent, those amendments recognized and protected civil but 
not social rights.  
D. Justice Harlan’s Post-Plessy Opinions 
Do Justice Harlan’s post-Plessy opinions shed any definitive light on 
how he might have answered the specific question of whether state-
mandated racial segregation of public school children violated the Equal 
Protection Clause?  
In Cumming v. Board of Education
181
 a unanimous Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Harlan, held that a school board’s “separate-and-unequal 
scheme”182 did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The school board 
decided to operate a high school for whites but not a separate high school 
for blacks. Noting that the issue of the legality of the state’s mandate that 
white and colored children be educated in separate schools was not before 
the Court, Justice Harlan concluded that it could not be said that the school 
board’s action denied to the African-American plaintiffs the equal 
 
 
 178. Justice Harlan also wrote about “a race so different from our own that we do not permit those 
belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. . . . I allude to the Chinese race.” Id. at 561. 
While members of that race are “absolutely excluded from our country . . . a Chinaman can ride in the 
same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race . . . who 
have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens” could not. Id. For more on this aspect of Justice 
Harlan’s dissent, see Davison M. Douglas, The Surprising Role of Racial Hierarchy in the Civil Rights 
Jurisprudence of the First Justice John Marshall Harlan, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1037, 1048 (2013); 
Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996). 
 179. See TINSLEY E. YARDBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 55 (1995). 
 180. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on 
Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2021 (2003). 
 181. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
 182. Klarman, supra note 62, at 45. 
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protection of the laws or any privileges belonging to them as United States 
citizens. He also observed that the “education of the people in schools 
maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states, 
and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the management 
of such schools cannot be justified except in a case of a clear and 
unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land. 
We have here no such case to be determined.”183 “For historians looking to 
Harlan as the prophet of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
Cumming is a disappointment.”184 
Thereafter, in Berea College v. Kentucky,
185
 the Court held that a 
Kentucky law prohibiting the teaching of black and white children in the 
same private institution did not violate the Constitution. In so holding, the 
Court concluded that the application of the law to the college—a 
corporation subject to the state’s power to alter, amend, or repeal the 
corporation’s charter—did not constitute a denial of due process or 
otherwise violate the Constitution. A dissenting Justice Harlan argued that 
the law was “an arbitrary invasion of the rights of liberty and property 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against hostile state action, and [was], 
therefore, void.”186 In his view, students of whatever race may choose “to 
sit together in a private institution of learning while receiving instruction 
which is not in itself harmful or dangerous to the public.”187 Justice Harlan 
made clear, however, that his position “ha[d] no reference to regulations 
prescribed for public schools, established at the pleasure of the state and 
 
 
 183. 175 U.S. at 545. This passage was quoted by the Court in Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 
(1927), wherein the Court held that a citizen of the United States who happened to be Chinese was not 
denied the equal protection of the laws “when he was classes among the colored races and furnished 
facilities for education equal to that offered to all, whether white, brown, yellow, or black.” Id. at 85. 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the Court, said that the decision to place “pupils of the 
yellow races” with black and not white students “is within the discretion of the state in regulating its 
public schools, and does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 87. Approvingly citing 
Cumming, the Chief Justice opined that the “right and power of the state to regulate the method of 
providing for the education of its youth at public expense is clear.” Id. at 85. He also noted that Plessy 
v. Ferguson’s validation of the separate-but-equal doctrine in the context of railway accommodations 
presented “a more difficult question” than the school segregation issue before the Gong Lum Court. 
With regard to “race separation” in schools, he quoted Plessy’s observation that such separation “‘has 
been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political 
rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.’” Id. (quoting Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)).  
 184. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 115, at 99. 
 185. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
 186. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). “The right to impart instruction to others is given by the 
Almighty for beneficent purposes” and “is a substantial right of property” and “part of one’s liberty 
. . .”  
 187. Id. at 68. 
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maintained at public expense. No such question [was] presented here and 
it need not now be discussed.”188  
In both Cumming and Berea Justice Harlan noted the issue of whether 
state-required education of white and black children in separate public 
schools violated the Constitution; as that question was not before the Court 
in either case, he did not have to provide an answer. Whether he would or 
would not have interpreted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as 
permitting state laws mandating racial segregation in public schools can 
only be the subject of guesswork. As things stand, there is no 
jurisprudential line spanning Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent, his pre- and 
post-Plessy jurisprudence, and the Court’s 1954 decision in Brown.  
 
*** 
 
A close reading and rereading of Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent calls 
into question Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s contention that the dissent 
supports their reading of the texts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Justice Harlan’s analysis and approach (which made no 
reference to those who framed or ratified the at-issue amendments) 
recognized the Reconstruction-era distinction between civil rights and 
social rights. He thus understood that the amendments did not proscribe all 
segregationist laws even as he differed with the Court over the category in 
which a particular claimed right should be placed. As James Fox notes, 
“the Reconstruction-era understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
that it barred some state-mandated segregation. But it is also true that some 
state-based segregation was intended to be left alone.”189 Civil rights were 
protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; social rights 
were not. One who is cognizant of the Reconstruction-era trichotomy 
could persuasively argue and conclude, contra Scalia and Garner, that the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as originally understood, cannot 
reasonably be thought to proscribe any and all laws separating persons on 
the basis of race, and that Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent provides no 
precedential support for an all-segregationist-laws-prohibited 
interpretation and application of those Reconstruction-era additions to the 
Constitution.  
 
 
 188. Id. at 69. 
 189. James W. Fox Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 675, 694 (2015–2016). 
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III. BROWN 
With the foregoing discussion in mind, the focus now turns to the 
following query: Are Justice Scalia and Garner correct that Brown can be 
squared with and justified by their view of the original understanding of 
the post-Civil War Amendments to the Constitution? 
A. The Originalist Arguments to the Court 
Brown addressed the question whether state-mandated racial 
segregation of black and white public school students in Kansas, Virginia, 
South Carolina, and Delaware violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
During the initial 1952 oral argument, John W. Davis, counsel for the 
school board in the case from South Carolina,
190
 argued that “the same 
Congress” that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1866 
proceeded in July 1866 “to establish or to continue separate schools in the 
District of Columbia.”191 Davis contended that twenty-three of the thirty 
states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
192
 “either then had, or 
immediately installed, separate schools for white and colored children 
under their public school systems. Were they violating the Amendment 
which they had solemnly accepted?”193 
In the Court’s 1952 post-argument conference Chief Justice Fred 
Moore Vinson expressed his belief that “the Plessy case was right.”194 
Justice William O. Douglas thought that the vote would be 5–4 in favor of 
the constitutionality of public school segregation.
195
 Reporting a different 
 
 
 190. Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
973, 1005 (2005) (book review) (Davis, “the most elite lawyer in America,” represented South 
Carolina pro bono).  
 191. Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliott, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 101, Dec. 10, 1952, in 49 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
331 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter “49 LANDMARK BRIEFS”]. 
 192. In 1868 the nation was comprised of thirty-seven states. 
 193. Oral Argument, supra note 192, at 333. According to Michael McConnell, school 
segregation was a widespread practice in both northern and southern states and the District of 
Columbia at the time of the proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment. The practice “almost 
certainly enjoyed the support of a majority of the population even at the height of Reconstruction.” 
McConnell, supra note 10, at 955–56. McConnell doubted that “an Amendment understood to outlaw 
so deeply ingrained an institutional practice” would have been proposed by Congress and ratified by 
the states. Id. at 956. 
 194. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1936–1961 187 (1994). 
 195. See id.; see also THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE 
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 661 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
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count, one author noted that four Justices (Hugo Lafayette Black, Harold 
Hitz Burton, Sherman Minton, and William O. Douglas) were prepared to 
invalidate school segregation; three Justices (Vinson, Stanley Forman 
Reed, and Tom Campbell Clark) were determined to uphold the practice; 
and the views of two Justices (Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson) 
were not certain.
196
 Stalling for time, Justice Frankfurter successfully 
urged his colleagues to set the cases for re-argument the following 
Term.
197
 The Court ordered re-argument and asked the parties to address 
several questions, including this query: “What evidence is there that the 
Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions 
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not 
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish 
segregation in public schools?”198 
Appearing before the Court at the 1953 re-argument,
199
 Davis repeated 
his count-the-states argument.
200
 In addition, he argued that the 
“overwhelming preponderance of the evidence demonstrate[d] that the 
Congress which submitted, and the state legislatures which ratified, the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate and did not understand that it 
would abolish segregation in public schools.”201 Davis advised the Court 
that “when we study the legislation enacted by Congress immediately 
before, immediately after, and during the period of the discussions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no question left that Congress did 
not intend by the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with the question of 
mixed or segregated schools.”202 In fact, Davis stated that when Congress 
was considering the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Representative James 
Wilson, the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, addressed the 
 
 
 196. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 305–06 
(2006). 
 197. “Recognizing the price that the nation would pay for a divided Court on a matter of such 
historic magnitude, Frankfurter devised a stall. As he indicated during the conference in late 1952, he 
proposed holding over the cases for reargument the following term.” Id. at 307.  
 198. 345 U.S. at 972. 
 199. Prior to the re-argument, Chief Justice Vinson suffered a fatal heart attack and was replaced 
on the Court by Earl Warren. Learning of Vinson’s death, Justice Frankfurter stated, “This is the first 
indication that I have ever had that there is a God.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL 
WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 72 (1983). 
 200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. The argument that a number of states had 
segregated schools when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 or established such schools 
thereafter was made in the post-Brown “Declaration of Constitutional Principles, also known as the 
Southern Manifesto.” See 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956). “The Manifesto’s central critique asserted that 
the decision violated the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Justin Driver, 
Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1063 (2014). 
 201. 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 194.  
 202. Id. at 482. 
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complaint that the statute “would do away with the separate schools.”203 
According to Wilson, “the Act did not mean” that white and black children 
“should attend the same school” and that such an interpretation of the Act 
would be “absurd.”204 
B. The Court’s Decision 
On May 17, 1954, the Court issued its unanimous decision striking 
down state-mandated school segregation.
205
 At the outset, the Court, per 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, determined that the sources examined in the re-
argument “cast some light” but were “not enough to resolve the problem 
with which [the Court was] faced. At best, they [were] inconclusive.”206 
The Court stated that at the time of the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “the movement toward free common schools, supported by 
general taxation, had not yet taken hold” in the south.207 The education of 
white children “was largely in the hands of private groups,” and the 
education of African-American children “was almost nonexistent, and 
practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes 
was forbidden by law in some states.”208 Congressional debates in northern 
states over the Fourteenth Amendment’s impact on public education were 
“generally ignored.”209 Accordingly, the Court declared, 
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We 
must consider public education in the light of its full development 
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only 
 
 
 203. Id. at 485.  
 204. Id. 
 205. On that same date, the Court invalidated the District of Columbia’s racially segregated public 
school system. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  
 206. 347 U.S. at 489; see also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
2349, 2380 (2015) (The Brown Court “spends several pages at the very beginning of the opinion 
fighting the original-meaning question to a draw.”). But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 156 (1999) (“[T]he very Congress that submitted the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification also supported segregated schools in the District of 
Columbia,” and the amendment’s supporters assured others that the amendment would not require 
racially integrated schools.”); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal 
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991) (“Evidence regarding the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous as to a wide variety of issues, but not school segregation. 
Virtually nothing in the congressional debates suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
prohibit school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation 
fanciful.”). 
 207. 347 U.S. at 489–90. 
 208. Id. at 490. 
 209. Id.  
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in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
210
  
The Court then considered the school segregation issue from a 
contemporary perspective: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the importance of education for our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state 
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.
211
 
 
 
 210. Id. at 492–93. 
 211. Id. at 493. A draft concurring opinion authored but never issued by Justice Robert H. Jackson 
also focused on the present and not the past: “I am convinced that present-day conditions require us to 
strike from our books the doctrine of separate-but-equal facilities and to hold invalid provisions of 
state constitutions or statutes which classify persons for separate treatment in matters of education 
based solely on possession of colored blood.” Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Jackson, and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 247 (quoting Memorandum by Mr. Justice 
Jackson, March 15, 1954, Brown file, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress.). Justice 
Jackson wrote that it could not be ignored “that the concept of the place of public education has 
markedly changed. Once a privilege conferred on those fortunate enough to take advantage of it, it is 
now regarded as a right of a citizen and a duty enforced by compulsory educations laws. Any thought 
of public education as a privilege which may be given or withheld as a matter of grace has long since 
passed out of American thinking.” Id. at 262.  
 During the Court’s deliberations Justice Jackson’s clerk (and later Supreme Court Chief Justice) 
William H. Rehnquist authored a memorandum headed “A Random Thought on the Segregation 
Case.” That document, signed by Rehnquist, stated: “I realize that it is an unpopular and 
unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues, but I think Plessy v. 
Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed. If the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact Spencer’s 
Social Statics, it just as surely did not enact Myrdal’s American Dilemma.” Id. at 246 (quoting the 
Rehnquist memo). In his 1971 Court confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
nominee Rehnquist testified that the memorandum “had been written at Justice Jackson’s request and 
represented Jackson’s views on the segregation cases.” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 608 
(2004). Questioning Rehnquist’s testimony, Bernard Schwartz wrote, “It is hard to believe that the 
man who wrote the sentences holding segregation invalid in his draft held the view only a few months 
earlier attributed to him by” Rehnquist”. Schwartz, supra,  at 267.  
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The Court asked and answered in the affirmative the question whether 
public school segregation on the basis of race unconstitutionally deprived 
minority children of equal educational opportunities “even though the 
physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal . . .”
212
 Noting 
its prior invalidations of state-mandated segregation in the graduate school 
setting,
213
 the Court opined that intangible factors and other considerations 
“apply with added force to children in grade and high schools.”
214
 
Separation of those children “from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”
215
 In support of this view, the Court quoted a 
district court’s finding in one of the cases before it for review: 
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater 
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the 
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro 
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of the child to 
learn. Segregation with the sanction of the law, therefore, has a 
tendency to retard the educational and mental development of 
Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they 
would receive in a racially integrated school system.”
216
 
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the 
time of Plessy v. Ferguson,” the Court concluded, “this finding is amply 
supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson 
contrary to this finding is rejected.”217 
The Brown Court’s nonoriginalist, if not antioriginalist opinion,218 
made clear that in resolving the issue of the constitutionality of state-
mandated racial segregation in public schools, the Court could not go back 
 
 
 212. 347 U.S. at 493 (quotations omitted). 
 213. See id. and cases cited therein; Ronald Turner, Plessy 2.0, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 861, 
882 (2009). 
 214. 347 U.S. at 494. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. (parentheses omitted). 
 217. Id. at 494–95 (footnote omitted). The “modern authority” language in the quoted text was 
supported by footnote 11 of the Court’s opinion and citations to social science studies. See id. at 494 
n.11. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 109, at 132; ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: 
A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 13–15 (1996). 
 218. See POSNER, supra note 89, at 198 (2013) (Brown is a nonoriginalist opinion.); Frank B. 
Cross, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 92 (2013) (Brown is “functionally an antioriginalist 
opinion.”). 
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to 1868, the year of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or to the 
1896 Plessy decision. Nor did the Court mention Justice Harlan’s dissent. 
What mattered were modernity and the facts and circumstances as they 
existed and were understood in 1954; the “modern realities of social 
stigma” and “real-world understanding of the meaning of equal 
protection”;219 and the lived experiences of African-American children 
negatively impacted by entrenched and legally sanctioned racial apartheid. 
Ruling in the present and not chained to or restrained by the past, the 
Court’s decision “was deliberately and unanimously not based on any 
version of original intent or meaning, despite the clear understanding of 
the justices that originalism was an option.”220 As for Justice Scalia’s and 
Garner’s argument that it is not clear and “probably not true” that it was 
necessary for the Court to rely on “changed times,”221 the problematics of 
the text—and Harlan analysis—offered in support of their position does 
not demonstrate that Brown’s result is consistent with their account of the 
original understanding and their thesis is ultimately unconvincing. 
IV. THE “RECENT RESEARCH” SUPPORTING THE BROWN-IS- ORIGINALIST 
THESIS 
Now consider Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s statement that “[r]ecent 
research persuasively establishes that “Brown is consistent with “the 
original understanding of the post-Civil War Amendments.”222 As support 
for this position they provide a “see generally” citation to Michael 
McConnell’s 1995 Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions article.223 
Remarkably absent is any reference to critiques of that article.
224
  
Commenting on Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s reference to one, and 
only one, authority, Mitchell Berman remarked: “it is simply 
unacceptable—not consistent with the standards that govern 
argumentation in law or academia—to announce that ‘[r]ecent research 
 
 
 219. ACKERMAN, supra note 108, at 298. 
 220. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (2007). 
 221. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 88. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See McConnell, supra note 10. 
 224. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response 
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (1996). 
For McConnell’s reply to Klarman, see Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for 
Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1996). For his reply to Maltz, see 
Michael W. McConnell, Segregation and the Original Understanding: A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 223 (1996). 
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persuasively establishes’ thus-and-such by citing a single article and 
failing to hint that it has been criticized and found unpersuasive by experts 
in the relevant discipline.”225 Scholars have noted, for instance, that 
McConnell focuses, not on the 1866–1868 framing and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but on the “post-ratification views of members of 
Congress [which] are not decisive evidence about constitutional 
meaning;”226 that his analysis, “based almost entirely on bills and floor 
debates in Congress,”227 “focus[es] more on original intent than on [the] 
original meaning” sought by Justice Scalia;228 and that McConnell’s 
“idiosyncratic—though defensible—version of originalism” has never 
been “used by anyone else in connection with any other question.”229 A 
single article presented as confirming research and authority supporting 
the Scalia/Garner text-and-Harlan analysis cannot carry the “persuasively 
establishes” label placed upon it.230   
 
 
 225. Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 MICH. L. REV. 777, 795–96 (2015); 
see also Posner, supra note 32 (Scalia and Garner cite McConnell’s article and “do not mention the 
powerful criticism of that article by Michael Klarman, a leading historian.”).  
 226. Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1659 (2004); see also POSNER, 
supra note 89, at 199; Turner, supra note 25, at 1187. 
 227. POSNER, supra note 89, at 199. 
 228. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (2005); Posner, supra note 32 (“[I]ronically, McConnell based his 
analysis on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which should be anathema to 
Scalia.”). 
 229. Mark Tushnet, From Judicial Restraint to Judicial Engagement: A Short Intellectual History, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1043, 1045 n.12 (2012). 
 230. Interestingly, McConnell’s 1995 post-ratification approach differs from his recent statement 
that those seeking to discern what the Constitution “actually meant” must look to those “who wrote 
and adopted it” and comprehend “ideas as they were understood at the time.” Michael W. McConnell, 
Time, Institutions, and Interpretations, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1755 (2015). In his words: 
For purposes of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, “the beginning” is the period of 
framing and ratification between 1866 and 1868, perhaps informed by the series of 
Reconstruction Acts passed under the authority of the new Amendments. The experience of 
slavery, the Civil War, and the immediate aftermath of the War provide the most pertinent 
necessary context, along with then-current interpretations of such legal language as “due 
process of law,” “equal protection of the laws,” and “privileges or immunities of citizens.” 
Id. at 1755–56. This analysis, including the call for then-extant and not contemporary interpretations of 
the “equal protection of the laws” and other language and phrases in the Fourteenth Amendment are 
consistent with the interpretive approaches taken in this essay. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Reading Law Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner argued that the 
Supreme Court’s seminal and nonoriginalist decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education can be squared with the original understanding of the post-Civil 
War Amendments to the Constitution. This essay’s examination and 
critique of what present as an originalist justification for Brown has argued 
and concluded that the Justice Scalia’s and Garner’s thesis is analytically 
deficient in at least three respects: (1) their readings of the texts of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as prohibiting all white-
supremacist and separationist laws is atextual, acontextual, and ahistorical; 
(2) their invocation of Justice Harlan and his Plessy dissent does not 
support, but actually cuts against their understanding of the original 
understanding; and (3) relying on a single and critiqued article, with no 
reference to that criticism, they fail to support their conclusory argument 
that recent research persuasively establishes that Brown is consistent with 
the original understanding. Accordingly, Reading Law’s originalist 
justification for Brown is flawed and ultimately unconvincing.  
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